To be sure, there are good arguments for intervening in Libya. As leader of the free world, the U.S. is called upon by its own decency and democratic values to act when longtime tyrant Moammar Qaddafi embarks on the wholesale slaughter of Libyans trying desperately to overthrow him. If this war ends up spelling the long-overdue end of Qaddafi’s 42-year reign of terror, it could send an important message to other tyrannies, not least Iran’s, that it is becoming more dangerous to deal with massive protest by murdering protesters. The big question, then, is what might follow.
But to a U.S. administration that values multilateralism above all — the more the better — none of this detracted from the Arab League’s allure as an arbiter, guide, and partner for policy toward Libya. For more than three weeks, as Qaddafi’s forces turned Libya’s uprising into a bloody rout, Obama dithered. Then, on March 12, the Arab League called for a no-fly zone over Libya. Hailing the wishes of the Arab League, though not bothering to seek a resolution from the U.S. Congress, the administration finally swung into action. Five days later, on March 17, the United Nations Security Council, with the enthusiastic vote of the U.S., approved Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force to protect Libyan civilians.
This murky resolution is a masterpiece of dangerous U.N. equivocation, and the Arab League’s fingerprints are all over it. What Libya actually needs is not a no-fly zone, but a no-Qaddafi zone. Resolution 1973 does not provide for that. Drafted with more concern for Arab League sensitivities than for the practicalities of dealing with Qaddafi and his ruinous reign over Libya, it rules out any foreign boots on the ground and limits the use of force to protecting civilians — a job likely to become increasingly risky, costly, and complex if Qaddafi endures and the conflict drags on....
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