From Meet the Press, January 30, 2011 on Egypt Revolt
Excerpt:
I also had the opportunity to speak to New York Times columnist Tom Friedman last night before he left the World Economic Forum in Davos. I began by asking him how we got to this moment.
MR. TOM FRIEDMAN: Well, we got to this moment, basically, because our concern about having a stable Egypt, first and foremost, to preserve the peace treaty with Israel, and later after 9/11, to be a partner in the war on terrorism, basically let us give Mubarak a pass on democratization. For the first 15 years or so of his rule, Egypt really did stagnate. I visited, gosh, back 12 years ago. I remember writing that Mubarak had more mummies in his Cabinet than King Tut, OK. Then he slowly, under our pressure, and under the pressure, really, of globalization, started to open up. And in the last few years, actually appointed a lot of reformers to his Cabinet who produced a real opening, a 6 percent growth, I believe, last year. But Egypt is in such a hole economically, David, that it needs to grow at China, India rates if it's going to even remotely have a chance to keep up with its population.
MR. GREGORY: Is there any way that Mubarak can stay?
MR. FRIEDMAN: You know, I don't want to make any predictions. You know, it's going to be determined by the Egyptian people. To me, I think what the United States should be focusing on are three things. One, emphasizing that we hope whatever transition there is peaceful. Two, that we hope that it will be built around consensual politics, not another dictatorship. And three, that whatever regime, whatever government emerges, whether it has the Muslim Brotherhood or not, it's a government that is dedicated to ushering Egypt into the 21st century.
Egypt, and really most of the Arab world, has been on vacation from history for the last 50 years, thanks largely to oil. Egypt didn't have oil, it had the peace treaty with Israel. What peace with Israel was to Egypt, oil is to Saudi Arabia. It got Egypt all of this aid, it allowed the regime to move very slowly on democratization, and now it's got to pay--play rapid catch-up.
The really sad thing is, David, is that, you know, the first rule of politics is make big decisions when you have strength and leverage on your side. Mubarak has had three decades, basically, to make the big decision of making Egypt--of promoting Egypt in a transition to democratization. He did not use this opportunity all these years, and now he's got to make a big decision. Egypt's got to make a big decision, not from a position of strength, but at least from the government's point of view, from a real position of weakness. You never make good decisions, you never make farsighted decisions from a position of weakness. So it's hard to see something positive ever coming out of the Mubarak-Egyptian relationship again.
I would add that Israel today, though, I think Israel should really reflect on what's going on in Egypt. It does not want to be the Hosni Mubarak of the peace process. Israel has never been stronger, militarily or economically. This is exactly the time it should be looking to forge and close a peace deal with the Palestinians, not because it's going to change the Arab world, but because it'll be a huge opportunity and stabilizer for that relationship.
MR. GREGORY: Tom, there's everything from the peace process, concerns the U.S. has about, obviously, our oil interests there, the influence of Iran, and, of course, Islamic extremism, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. What are the ripple effects? What comes next here in terms of all of those problems?
MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, you know, David, I think for all of us analysts inside, outside, the most dangerous thing you can do in a situation like this is confuse your hopes with your analysis. I know what my hopes are. My hopes are we'll see a transition in Egypt that will allow the emergence of a Muslim moderate progressive center there, precisely what Mubarak never built. But my analysis and my fear is, especially looking at the news, the looting today and whatnot, is that when you open the lid on a society like this, where the government has done nothing, basically, to build civil society for the last 20 years, what comes out is anger, rage, and makes the building of a modern, progressive center that much more difficult.
Now, the implications are enormous. One of the big questions is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a huge, powerful movement. Will they go for one of three strategies? One is to emulate Iran, which is to hijack the Islamic revolution, or hijack what was a popular revolution into an Islamic revolution. The other is the Hamas, which was a coup d'etat, basically, in Gaza. Or, ideally, the option we hope they'll choose, is the Turkey model, be a partner in a consensual rebuilding of Egypt and basically try to build their strength on a democratic foundation.
MR. GREGORY: How does President Obama walk this line, supporting a vital U.S. ally in Mubarak, siding with the Egyptian people?
MR. FRIEDMAN: Three principles. We, we support nonviolence, we support consensual politics, and we support any Egyptian government and outcome that will be on the side of ushering Egyptians into the 21st century, enabling and empowering them to do so. Ultimately, that's what they've been so frustrated about, and that's what we have to be on the side of.
MR. GREGORY: You've often said, Tom, you're not often surprised. You haven't been surprised by the Middle East in some time. Did this surprise you?
MR. FRIEDMAN: It surprises me in the immediate, but, but not in the abstract.
You know, David, there, there is a joke that went around Egypt for many years about Mubarak that he was on his death bed and an Egyptian delegation came to see him of the people. The nurse came in, said, "Mr. President, the people are here to say goodbye." And Mubarak said, "Oh, really? Where are they going?" So, you know, Egyptians have been telling this joke for a long time. It isn't funny anymore.
MR. FRIEDMAN: A pleasure.
MR. GREGORY: Tom Friedman, thank you very much.
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